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Abstract
The European Central Bank  will be able to reach its objective of price stability by GDP and inflation
forecasts. But price stability will continue to be accompanied by the burden of high and in the case
of some disadvantaged regions increasing unemployment which will be the cause of persisting and
perhaps widening interregional inequality. This will impose costs from income loss which must be
set against the long-term benefits of monetary integration to the disadvantage regions which might
accrue by the diffusion of growth and its positive effects on employment. Monetary stability will be
more beneficial for the peoples of Europe if it is combined with policies fostering balanced growth
with maximum employment. This requires an integrated cohesion strategy encompassing policies for
employment and regional development which will induce and accelerate real convergence for all the
regions of the countries participating in the European Economic and Monetary Union.
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1. Introduction
It is often said that the fundamental task of the central bank is to preserve the value of the
currency. Research has shown that central banks can best meet this challenge if they are independent
and adopt a low inflation target with some flexibility for price shocks in recognition of the short-run
tradeoff between inflation and (cyclical) unemployment. In general, countries instruct their central
bank to reach a particular target of inflation and of unemployment. This is represented formally by
a loss function that weights the squared deviations of inflation and unemployment from their target
values:
L = (p - p*)
2 + b(u - u*)
2  
where p and p* are the actual and desired inflation rates, u and u* are the actual and desired
unemployment rates and b0 denotes the weight on the stabilisation of the unemployment level
around its long-run target level. If the weight b is zero, there is a single goal of monetary policy: price
stability. However, unemployment is considered undesirable because an important factor of
production remains underutilised. Consequently, both employment and price stability are necessary
for increasing society’s economic welfare. Target employment usually means the level of “maximum2
1The recently concluded Amsterdam Treaty (1997) makes more explicit references to the
problem of unemployment.
employment” which is compatible with “stable prices”. When inflation is above its target value,
society suffers a loss equal to the squared difference between actual and target inflation.  
The standard model is based on the assumption that there is a relatively constant long-run
unemployment equilibrium rate, the “natural rate” of unemployment (or the non-accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment,  NAIRU) which is consistent with stable inflation. Unexpected demand or
supply shocks may cause temporary deviations from that rate of unemployment. It is usually believed
that in the short run the level of inflation is inversely related to the level of unemployment. Therefore,
as a rule policies that lower the inflation rate are expected to result in higher unemployment. When
the monetary policies of the central bank are directed towards price stability and reach and maintain
their target, the economy returns to the “natural rate” of unemployment. Therefore, if the NAIRU
exists and it is steady, the central bank needs only to pursue price stability and labour market and
output equilibrium will follow. This implies that the central bank’s monetary policy should have just
one objective: price stability. In the United States, however, Congress directs the Federal Reserve to
aim at two objectives “maximum employment” and “price stability”. The statutes of the European
Central Bank (ECB) are less explicit
1. They stipulate that the ECB’s primary objective will be “to
define and implement the monetary policy of the Community” and “to support the general policies
of the Community”. A “high level of employment” is included among the objectives of the
Community’s general policies. Therefore, the promotion of full employment and growth are among
the implicit objectives of the ECB which it can pursue but only to the extent that this does not conflict
with its primary target of price stability. Moreover, the EU countries have also agreed to implement3
a European initiative to fight unemployment. But, while the target inflation rate p* will be the primary
objective and responsibility of the ECB’s centralised policy, the longer-term target of a low
unemployment rate u* will be pursued by collaborative action of the member states themselves,
coordinated by the Community. Thus, tacitly, the EU countries have attributed the high rate of
European unemployment to structural factors specific to each country, and have decided that it is
inappropriate to instruct the independent ECB to take the member states’ unemployment (or the level
of output) explicitly into account when designing its EU monetary policy. 
The standard theory maintains that, although the NAIRU may not be fixed, a tradeoff
relationship between inflation and unemployment does exist. The “natural rate” of unemployment
shifts because it depends on the structure of the economy and on demographic factors and institutional
features of the product and labour markets of each country which can change over time. Thus a falling
labour force (in the EU, by the ageing population), increasing competition in the product markets (in
the EU, by advancing market integration) and slackening of the rigidities of labour markets (in the
EU, by institutional reform) reduce the NAIRU. In contrast to the standard model, other schools of
thought maintain that the NAIRU does not exist or, even if it exists, its frequent and random shifts
render it useless for predicting the inflation rate or for guiding the economy to maximum employment
(Galbraith, 1997).  The defects of the NAIRU of the countries of the European Union are often
overlooked in discussions about the EMU as if the single currency will solve all the problems. Our
argument is that if in the European Union the NAIRU exists, besides its volatility, it also is ill-defined
because of the wide dispersion of unemployment rates around the mean. This is particularly pertinent
at the regional level of measurement. However, this will not prevent the ECB from reaching its target
of price stability. In fact, the ECB will inherit a low inflation rates from the compliance of the EMU4
2See Bean (1994); and Nickell (1997).
3 In contrast to the European countries for most of which there are no statistically reliable
Phillips curves and “natural rate” of unemployment estimates, in the United States there are
estimates of a seemingly stable natural rate at around 6 percent unemployment: Gordon (1997).
participants with the entry criteria. Therefore, the main aim of the ECB in its first years will be to
maintain price stability. But besides the institutional aspects of the single currency, the relations of
the ECB with the financial markets and the public are also important. The EU is aware that “selling”
the euro to a skeptical public means that it must convince the people it will bring prosperity and jobs.
But the discipline imposed by monetary union rule means that employment is a low priority target
and increasing spending on job creation by the governments of the EU member states is practically
overruled. Therefore, the European aspiration for price stability at a minimum level of unemployment
may be unattainable in the foreseeable future, despite the rhetoric of the European initiative. 
In recent years, there has been a remarkable convergence in the inflation rates of the European
countries. But, while inflation has been stabilised at a low level, unemployment has not fallen or in
some cases it has risen. There is also a great diversity in the inter-country rates of unemployment.
There have been a large number of competing explanations for the rise of European unemployment
2
but in the end what they amount to is that:
 “Different European countries are effectively different labor markets” which “exhibit
enormous diversity” (Nickell, 1997, p. 55);
 there is no single and stable European natural rate of unemployment; there may be 15 volatile
national NAIRUs one for each EU member state
3;
 there is great diversity and insignificant convergence between these 15 NAIRUs.
To these we add that in the EU:5
 there is a wide range of regional unemployment associated with any given rate of inflation;
 there is insufficient labour mobility within and between the EU states.
Therefore, our argument is that the European Central Bank will achieve and maintain its target of
price stability. But it will be difficult for the ECB and the governments of the member states to
pinpoint a stable rate of low inflation which will be associated with a corresponding stable level of
low unemployment. For ECB purposes, there may be no empirical regularity between the target
inflation rate which it will pursue, reach and maintain and the unemployment rate which will remain
high and probably variable. It is also likely than unemployment would rise further because of the still
unresolved regional inequality problems which may worsen by monetary integration. These problems
and the associated regional income disparities may have important implications on stability, social
cohesion and the progress towards economic integration. Eventually, to decide whether monetary
integration is beneficial overall and for all the members of the EMU, the cost of higher unemployment
must be compared with the positive gains of price stability.
2. Mean Unemployment and Dispersion in the EU
A single currency means that countries can no longer use changes in the exchange rate to cut real
wages when labour demand falls. When labour markets are rigid, monetary union makes sense if
regional labour mobility can substitute for real wage adjustment to absorb a regional shock.
Unemployed workers could migrate to another region, add to its employed labour force, increase its
income and demand, and thus undo the effects of the shock. If labour migration is unavailable,
regions will be unable to adjust to an asymmetric shock and will have to go through a period of6
protracted unemployment until real wages fall to the desirable level. In Europe, both labour mobility
and wage flexibility are limited and therefore unemployment is high.
In practice, commodity prices adjust fast and, therefore, at the national level price dispersions
are assumed away. In principle, migration should operate in the labour markets to even
unemployment discrepancies in a similar equalising way: labour from high-unemployment regions
should move to low-unemployment regions. Then by interregional wage convergence regional
inequalities and unemployment differentials would be eliminated. However, wide dispersions in the
unemployment rates exist and are persistent for reasons associated with the general regional
inequality problem. The natural process of adjustment anticipated by the classical model is not only
slow but also uncertain because the conditions necessary for ‘convergence’ are not always satisfied.
For instance, capital and labour might not be perfectly mobile and persistent disparities among
regions may exist in production technology, economies and diseconomies of scale, obstacles to the
market mechanism and the quality and skill of labour supply. Therefore, regional disparities can be
self-perpetuating and, in the absence of intervention in support of the market forces, self-reinforcing.
Unemployment rates across EU member states differ widely, ranging from 2.7 per cent  in
Luxembourg to 22.3 per cent  in Spain (April 1995). At the level of individual regions, the disparities
across the Community are even wider. They widened for much of the 1980s and by 1990
‘unemployment in the ten worst-affected regions averaged 25.3 per cent, seven times higher than in
the ten least affected regions where rates averaged just 3.6 per cent’ (Com, 1994). In 1995, among
the 169 regions of the Community for which harmonised regional unemployment data are available,
the unemployment rate ranged from 2.7 per cent (in Luxembourg which makes up one region; or 3.9
per cent  in a ‘proper’ region, Trentino-Alto Adige, Italy) to 33.3 per cent (Andalusia, Spain). Figure7
4Some regions of Portugal and Greece also belong to this category of unemployment. This
is partly explained by the weak social security systems of these two countries, which reduce the
incentive to register as unemployed, and  the high dependence of their population on agriculture,
which implies underemployment. In general, official unemployment statistics are suspect. For
example, the UK official unemployment rate of 5.2 per cent, which is based on the number of
people claiming unemployment benefit, sits oddly with the finding that between one-in-four and
one-in-five British families have no wage earner. Eurostat estimates the unemployment by
combining the results of the Community labour sample survey with information on the regional
structure of the number of registered unemployed (but for Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and the
Netherlands: the regional structure of the number of unemployed according to national labour
force surveys): Eurostat (1997) Regions, p. XI. The classification of regions is at NUTS2 level. 
1 shows the frequency distribution of the regional unemployment in the EU in 1993 (U93) and 1995
(U95). Table 1 shows that the ratio of the highest regional unemployment rate to the lowest, which
can be taken as a measure of the regional inequality in employment within a country. It ranges from
6.6 in Italy to 1.6 in the Netherlands and Sweden. But at the level of the Community, which after
completion of the single market can be considered as one entity comprising the entire set of member
states’ regions, it reaches 11.3 thus suggesting a very high level of EU interregional inequality. During
the period 1983-95, only 16 per cent of the EU regions displayed an unemployment rate lower than
6 per cent. In 1995, the situation worsened with only 10 per cent of the regions in the high
employment category. These advantaged regions have remained in the same category for at least 10
years and are clustering in a small number of nearby areas, the south of the Netherlands and of
Germany, the north of Italy and the north east and south west of Denmark
4. At the opposite end of
the spectrum 19 regions experienced unemployment above the 15 percent rate in 1995. The
disadvantaged regions are at the periphery: they are concentrated in Spain, the south of Italy and parts
of Ireland and Finland. With the exception of Finland, these high unemployment regions have
remained8
5The correlation coefficient between the regional unemployment rates of 1993 with those
of 1995 is 0.954. In fact, the regression of the unemployment rates of 1995 (U95) on those of
1993 (U93) shows their close relationship and the stability of unemployment over these two
years: 
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      Figure 1:  Frequency Distribution of EU Regional Unemployment in 1993 and 1995
 in the same group for more than 10 years
5. Therefore, this is not a case of asymmetric shocks causing9
                                                    t-values  2.748  41.219
                                     R
2 = 0.911, F(1, 167) = 1698.99,   = 1.740.
diverse effects on unemployment but of a permanent pool of persistent regional unemployment
imbalances which are invariant to temporary shocks and to cyclical disturbances. The interregional
differentials suggest that the problem of unemployment has a regional dimension: many countries
exhibit structural inequalities which result in the coexistence of regions with high employment and
regions with high unemployment. These problems are regional and cannot be solved by national
monetary policies.
Relative to their shares in the Community’s GDP, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Finland,
Ireland and the United Kingdom display the worst overall incidence of unemployment among the
member states, contributing 57 percent to the Community’ s total unemployment (10.2 million out
of 17.8 million of total unemployment in the EU in 1995), while they share between them only 37
percent of the EU-gdp. In other words, the rate of unemployment is highest in the countries which
are the least able to afford it. Alternatively, the cost of unemployment in terms of income loss is
largest where the unemployment is highest. Spain presents the worst performance among the EU
countries with its share of unemployment in the EU being about three times larger than its share of
GDP: see Figure 2. 
The pattern of the regional distribution of unemployment within the Community suggests the
existence of poles of development and high employment within the EU as well as the inability of the
regional problem to self-correct, and of the regional policy, both national and Community, to solve
it. Despite the efforts made, regional disparities in the EU with regard to incomes,                
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prosperous regions of the Economic Union, the 10 poorest regions have an average per capita income
which is three-and-a-half times lower and an unemployment rate which is six times higher”
(European   
                     Figure 2: Member States’ Shares in EU Unemployment and GDP in 1995
Parliament, 1996, p. 4). Market integration with centralisation of monetary policy may very well
fortify the centripetal forces within the EU, resulting in higher concentration of economic activity to
the established growth poles within the “hard core” of the Community - Germany and its neighbours:
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Sweden. Therefore, economic
activity at the peripheral regions of the Union - Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Finland and
the United Kingdom - may be affected negatively and disproportionately from the effects of economic11
6The classification of countries in the “hard core” group and the periphery is based on the
degree to which various macroeconomic indicators, e.g. output, real exchange rates,
unemployment, etc., are correlated across countries: see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994).
and monetary integration
6. 
3. High Unemployment Regions and Migration
One of the questions considered by the literature for evaluation of the cost/benefits of EMU is: are
external shocks and the exchange rate important for unemployment?  If the answer is yes, then the
conclusion is that the cost of EMU will be high: countries will be better off by keeping their own
currency and national monetary policy. However, this will not be the case if labour mobility, which
operates as the shock absorber, is high.
Studies have shown that the contribution of interstate migration in the United States plays a
major role in the elimination of regional labour-market disequilibria, dominating that of wage
flexibility and labour force participation (Blanchard and Katz, 1992). It seems, however, that in the
US the driving force for the large scale mobility of labour is not wage differentials but the interstate
movement by firms. Since in the EU the cross-border movements by firms are relatively limited, in
the case of country-specific shocks labour migration is unlikely to be a strong force for adjustment.
Labour market studies concentrating on the European case have confirmed these conclusions. For
example, they have found that in the first three years following a disturbance most of the decline in
regional labour demand is met by increased unemployment and reduced labour force participation,
that is by workers dropping out of the labour market. Only four years after the shock the impact of
migration becomes evident (Decressin and Fatas, 1995). These results suggest that Europe is less12
suited for monetary union than 13
Table 1:  Regional unemployment in the Community - April 1995
Rates   B DK   D GR   E F IRL   I  L NL  P  FI  SE UK EU
1.Highest  15.9   - 18.6 13.2 30.5 15.3   - 25.9  - 9.6 11.4 21.7 12.0 13.0 30.5
2.National   9.5 7.1   8.2   9.0 22.3 12.4 14.3 12.3 2.7 7.5  7.1 16.8  9.5  9.0 11.2
3.Lowest   5.3   -   4.1   4.1 12.6   7.1   -   3.9  - 6.1  3.9  6.2  7.3   6.7   2.7
4. s.d.  3.6 2.0   3.6   2.8   5.8   2.1   0.9   7.1  - 1.0  2.6  5.7  1.6   1.7  6.0
5.Ratio:1/3  3.0   -   4.5   3.2   2.4   2.1   -   6.6  - 1.6  2.9  3.5  1.6   1.9 11.3 
6.Inflation  1.4 1.7   2.2   9.3   4.9   1.7   2.2   5.0 3.5 1.4  5.0  2.7  4.1   2.4   2.9
7. U%  2.2 1.1 18.0   2.1 19.9 15.7  1.1 15.3 0.0 3.0  1.9  2.5  2.2 14.0 100.0
8. GDP%  3.2 2.1 28.8   1.1   6.7 18.3  0.7 12.9 0.2 4.7  1.2  1.5  2.7 13.2 100.0
Notes: s.d. = standard deviation; U%= national share in the total EU-Unemployment, April 1995; GDP%=national share in the 
EU-GDP, 1995, in Purchasing Power Parity terms. Inflation rate is the GDP deflator. Regional unemployment data for 
Austria are not available; Austria’s share in EU-Unemployment is 1.0 and in EU-GDP is 2.7.
Sources: Data compiled from: Eurostat (1996), Regions: Statistical Yearbook; and European Economy (1996): Broad Economic
Guidelines.14
7But this explanation ignores the large waves of (mostly but not exclusively) seasonal
migration from Southern Europe to Northern Europe in the 1950s and the 1960s which ended
after the oil crises of the 1970s.
8An additional reason might be that once income exceeds a certain threshold people
are no longer willing to incur the psychological cost of moving (Faini, 1994). But this does
not explain why USA labour, which is relatively well off, continues to be highly mobile.
the USA. This conclusion is reinforced by the estimated elasticity of interregional migration with
respect to both unemployment and wage differentials which are significantly smaller in the EU
countries than in the United States (Eichengreen, 1993). Therefore, despite the de jure removal
of many of the obstacles to factor movement, labour mobility within and between EU countries
remains limited, thus resulting in persistent unemployment which has become the substitute for
interregional migration (Thomas, 1994). The low labour mobility between the EU member states
is often attributed to cultural and social barriers
7 as well as to the relative inflexibility of European
labour markets
8. Whatever the reason for low labour mobility, the conclusion reached by most
studies is that Europe is characterised by low response of migration to region-specific shocks and,
therefore, the EU is less suited for monetary union than the United States. But some studies rightly
suggest that since the sluggish labour market response to unemployment is as much a problem
within member states as across Europe as a whole, monetary union may be no more risky than the
status quo of national currencies (Decressin and Fatas, 1995). However, these generalisations are
not justified by the considerable variation in the relationship between unemployment and
migration among the European regions. An explanation for this interregional diversion might be
that in several regions the unemployed workers are unskilled (e.g., redundant agricultural labour)
or become unskilled during the lengthy period of their unemployment as rapid technological
progress (such as information technology) leaves them behind. Therefore, increasing wage
flexibility cannot induce migration and therefore on its own it cannot solve the problem of
persistent regional unemployment.15
9An unresolved issue in this type of analysis is to decide what degree of correlation is
sufficiently high to support a proposition. In this case we adopt as benchmark a correlation
higher than 0.3. The unemployment data of our study refer to April 1993 and the net
migration data to the year 1993. Using the April 1995 unemployment data instead of those of
April 1993, the results are similar. Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland make up one region
each, and regional data for Austria are not published. Therefore, for these four countries
correlation coefficients cannot be calculated. 
10Evidence from the UK (McCormick, 1997) and Spain (Antolin and Bover, 1997)
confirms that in these two countries unemployment is not a push factor of labour mobility:
“individuals do not respond to their own unemployment nor to high unemployment in their
regions by migrating” (Antolin and Bover, 1997, p. 230). Therefore, migration does not
contributed to a reduction in the pattern of interregional differentials of unemployment.
To examine this proposition we calculated the correlation coefficients between net
migration (%) and unemployment (%) at the regional level of each EU member country
9. Only
Germany, Portugal, Finland and Sweden among the EU countries display high and negative
correlation between the two rates, implying that regions with high rates of unemployment
experience net emigration. It can be argued, therefore, that only in four of the EU countries
increasing unemployment might induce labour mobility
10. 
For a better understanding of this issue it is more appropriate to examine the regional
relationship between unemployment and migration at the EU level. For this we sorted the 169 EU
regions in descending order of the unemployment rate. This classification yielded unemployment
median equal to 9.2 percent, with the lower unemployment quartile (25% of the sample, that is
42 regions) at 6.0 percent median and 4.8 percent mean unemployment; and the higher
unemployment quartile ( 25% of the sample, that is 42 regions) at 13.1 percent median and 18.6
percent mean unemployment. There is no statistically significant relationship between the rates
of net migration and unemployment in the 42 highest unemployment European regions which
account for about 45 per cent of the total EU unemployment. In contrast, there is a statistically
significant relationship between the two rates in the remaining 127 regions (75% of the sample)
of lower unemployment rates with estimated elasticity of net migration with respect to16
11For an explanation of regional unemployment see Antolin and Bover (1997). Our
analysis is based on correlation coefficients. But, without attempting to explain anything, we
also ran regressions of the net regional migration, M93, on regional unemployment, U93,
using the 1993 set of data. The estimates for the 42 high unemployment regions (45% of the
total EU unemployment) are:
M93 = 15.59 - 0.90 U93
                                                      t-values    1.44   1.60
                                                R
2 =0.06, = 15.86, F= 2.56
For the 127 lower unemployment regions (55% of the total EU unemployment) the estimates
are:
M93 = 9.71 - 0.64U93
                                                      t-values   6.86    3.70
                                                R
2 =0.100, = 5.19, F= 13.76,
and the elasticity of migration with respect to unemployment is e = -1.05. Regional 
heterogeneity could perhaps explain why ‘one of the most perplexing problems in migration
research was the failure of local unemployment rates to consistently operate in the expected
direction’ (Greenwood, 1993).
unemployment equal to -1.05: that is, an increase in unemployment causes an equiproportional
emigration from these regions
11.
This result confirms that there is a core of hard hit unemployment regions where the
mobility of labour is low. It is this group of regions that keeps the unemployment rate high in
Europe and distorts the statistics of labour mobility induced by unemployment. The question is
why the unemployed labour of these regions does not emigrate to other regions, within the same
country or in other countries, in search of better employment opportunities?
4. Persistent Unemployment in the EU
Three explanations for the persistence of high unemployment in Europe in the 1990s have been
offered: labour market rigidities, hysteresis and skill-biased technological progress.
The OECD (1994) Jobs Study has attributed the high unemployment to labour market
rigidities which arise from the welfare state, minimum wage rates and the high cost of legal17
restrictions of hiring and firing employees. Thus, unemployment benefits lower the incentive for
job search and increase wage pressure from those in work; minimum wages price the least skilled
out of the market; and firing costs deter hiring, reducing labour demand and hampering the
economy’s ability to deal with uncertainty and structural change. Hence the frequent
recommendation for a more flexible labour market. However, the empirical evidence for this
explanation is rather weak. In a variant of the labour-market rigidities explanation, the EU takes
the line that the persistence of regional unemployment reflects a relatively high inflexibility of
regional real wage structures which are set by national wage bargaining and often do not reflect
the interregional productivity differentials. The institutional differences in the wage setting
process also play a role in the different unemployment rates across the member states.
Accordingly, the solution to the problem of regional unemployment is labour market
liberalisation, institutional reform and a higher degree of regional wage differentiation in
accordance with regional differences in productivity levels. 
The second explanation is that temporary shocks have persistent effects on the human
capital of the unemployed, their job search effectiveness and the perception of employers about
them. A long period of unemployment increases the stock of the long-term unemployed who lose
their skills and their work habits. Skill deterioration may lead to wage offers below the reservation
wage rate, encouraging the unemployed to drop out of the “effective” labour force, although they
may still appear in the unemployment statistics (Bean, 1994). Some also add that generous
unemployment benefits and slow response by governments to the problem of unemployment help
to turn this situation into a lasting feature of many European economies. Therefore, it is difficult
to get unemployment down once it has been allowed to rise. The result  is an apparent increase
in the natural rate of unemployment. However, although all these points sound possible, the
empirical evidence for this track of explanations is ambiguous.18
The third strand of research has examined the role of skill-biased technological progress.
The argument is that in recent years the demand for skilled labour has risen fast while the demand
for unskilled labour has fallen. For example, the skilled-wage premium has risen sharply as a
result of technological change that has sifted demand in favour of skilled-intensive sectors. Thus
the skilled-biased technological progress has led to increasing unemployment of the unskilled
which has pushed up the overall rate of  unemployment in Europe (Krugman, 1994). In addition
to these problems, the increasing pace of international economic integration has caused unskilled
labour to become more easily substitutable across national borders by increased trade and
investment flows. According to some studies, the rise of globalisation caused the hourly wages
of young low-skilled American workers to drop by 20 percent between 1979 and 1989, while in
Europe real wages at the bottom of the skill distribution rose, but unemployment has increased
significantly (Freeman, 1996). 
Our explanation is based on regional inequality and is an extension of the latter two
strands. Long-term unemployment in times of rapid innovation (such as information technology)
and advancing globalisation reduces progressively the technological skills of the unemployed and
weakens their work habits. Long-term unemployment is a dominant characteristic of some
comparatively disadvantaged regions which, because of changes in production and international
trade, have been left behind in terms of human and physical capital investment, technological
progress and labour skills. Thus, through time, the unemployed of these regions have become
unemployable both in the region of their residence and in every other region. Globalisation has,
perhaps, accentuated this problem with production requiring unskilled labour moving to less
developed countries. Therefore, for the unskilled and unemployed labour of Europe emigration
in search of a job is not an option. In contrast to the unskilled labour, the mobility of qualified
workers between EU countries is growing in importance, causing concern in some member states19
12The alternative to targeting inflation on the natural rate of unemployment is to target
it on the “natural output” level, y. Then the loss function takes the form:
L = (p - p*)
2 + ay
2
where a0 denotes the weight on output stabilisation around the natural output level.
However, this approach will also entail problems for the ECB because there is no easy way to
estimate the natural output level of Europe. Since the combined contribution of Germany,
France and the Benelux countries to the EU-GDP was in 1995 about 55 percent, it can be
argued that the ECB could base its policy on the “natural” GDP level of these countries. But
this could be regarded as demotion of all other countries and their economies to the periphery.
   
because of the perceived risk that this integration-induced “brain drain” is permanent (Sexton et
al., 1991). Therefore, to the extent the bulk of European unemployment consists of the least
qualified workers and it is high because of the inherent problems of regional inequality,
unbalanced technological progress, labour skill gaps and progressive loss of comparative
advantage, the reduction of unemployment and the adjustment to a lower European NAIRU will
take a long time
12. In the shorter-run, the increasing economic integration of Europe may lead to
reallocation of employment and production within the EU by widening and deepening the Union
over time. While industrial concentration will ignore national borders, monetary integration may
lock some regions (and countries) into uncompetitive positions. Therefore, any existing ‘cost
advantage of “peripheral” regions may become smaller as further economic integration leads to
the harmonisation of macroeconomic conditions and upward pressure on wage levels”
(Commission, 1994). It can be argued that economic growth will bring the “automatic” adjustment
of regional disparities into action. But this process of reinstating equilibrium could take a very
long time. Alternatively, it can be equally argued that, if the economy exhibits increasing returns,
the reduction of trade barriers could improve the attractiveness of existing centrally located
growth poles (Krugman and Venables, 1992), leading to a concentration of economic structure.
Industrial agglomeration in one location attracts new investment, offers new opportunities for
work and prompts workers to move there. But these will be the skilled workers who have20
13However, it is assumed that the ECB, on behalf of the “ins”,  will follow the
successful example of the Bundesbank by adopting an intermediate money target while
aiming at a specific inflation rate. Then the “outs” would be expected to stabilise their
exchange rates towards the euro. Needless to say that the ultimate target of economic policy is
(or should be) the improvement in the standard of living. 
increased their flexibility and competence by keeping pace with technological developments. The
unskilled will remain unemployed in the declining peripheral regions. In the EU, where regional
economic policy has remained weak and ineffective, there is no common fiscal policy for
alleviating the existing and probably widening differentials between the EU regions (Hitiris,
1996). Without an efficient policy for balance development, the process of economic and
monetary integration may deepen the problem of regional inequality and ‘migration cannot
realistically be expected to play much of a role in reducing current unemployment disparities in
Europe’ (Begg, 1995). 
5. The ECB’s Targets and Policies
The ECB will operate independently under a legal mandate to ensure price stability. This is not
an easy task because there is no information about how the European economy behaves and what
degree of credibility the ECB will gain from the public. Conditioning the entry to the EMU on the
“convergence criteria” means that the ECB will inherit its position with inflation rates in the
member states close to its target of price stability. But how this position will be maintained is not
known because the ECB will be a new institution without a track record
13. Therefore, in Europe
the credibility of monetary policy will evolve over time and the reputation of the ECB will
develop by a process of learning and communicating with the financial markets by greater
transparency: clarifying its goals to the public and the links between these goals and its day-to-day21
actions and responses to temporary economic shocks - that is by establishing a monetary
framework. Studies have shown that the recent history of the unemployment rate in Europe would
not help the ECB22
14This is also confirmed by recent research (for France and the UK) which has found
that  “the data are consistent with multiple equilibria models where large shocks bring the
economy from one equilibrium to another, and also with models with a moving natural rate”
(Bianchi and Zoega, 1997).
15 Shifts in the NAIRU are not uncommon. In the United States, the NAIRU “is
estimated to have increased steadily from 3.5 percent in the mid-1960s to a peak of 7.25
percent in 1980, and then to have fallen back to about 5.75 percent in 1988" (Adams and Coe,
1990). There are no reliable estimates of an aggregate European Union NAIRU. This does not
mean that it does not exist: it means that the methods employed (mostly regression analysis)
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  Figure 3: Inflation (p) and Unemployment (u) in the EU-15 countries, 1962-97
 to forecast the inflation rate because a European NAIRU does not exist or, if it exists, it shifts
often and unpredictably
14, so that the band of statistical uncertainty surrounding it is so broad as
to render it useless for the conduct of policy
15. These conclusions may not be right. Figure 3
illustrates the evolution of inflation (p) and unemployment (u), and Figure 4 the evolution of the
97. Both Figures clearly show that there is a negative relationship between inflation and23
16Indeed, the Phillips curve may be non-linear with an asymmetry in the
unemployment-inflation tradeoff. The implication of these properties for economic policy are
that unsuccessful policies to reduce the business cycle may induce more unemployment
(Debelle and Laxton, 1997).
17The long-term unemployment is less variable than the short-term unemployment.
Therefore, the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation may exist only with reference to
short-term unemployment (Nickell, 1997). Figure 4, which illustrates rates of change, could
be considered as a representation of this case. 
unemployment in Europe. However, this relationship may not be linear
16 and systematic. One of
the many reasons that might have contributed to this performance could be that the rate European
unemployment is high and widely dispersed between the regions which display low response to
 labour market disequilibria
17. We have argued that a factor contributing to this phenomenon is
the relative immobility of labour from high unemployment regions to high employment regions
which is the outcome of a vicious circle: long-term unemployment causes skill loss, which makes
labour 
unemployable and therefore immobile. To brake these conditions, the EU needs to implement
concerted action to liberalise the labour markets, accelerate convergence and raise the skills of the
unemployed. This will also help the EU to gain a competitive position and comparative advantage
in the world markets. But this is a long-term project. For example, in the case of Spain four
million jobs are needed to reduce unemployment significantly. This may  require drastic
deregulation of the labour market accompanied by 5 per cent annual GDP growth sustained over
the course of a decade (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). An ex post assessment has also estimated
that by 1994 the Single Market Programme generated 600,000 additional employment posts
(Commission, 1996), which are very few when the unemployed are 18 million. Economic growth
on its own takes a very
long time to solve the unemployment problem. Under plausible conditions and parameters, it may







year 1970 1980 1990
du%
dp%
of 5 per cent (Coleman, 1997). The European Parliament (1996) also notes that: “As things stand
at present, a region with GDP of 50% of the Community average will take some 20 years to 
                   
     Figure 4: Changes in Unemployment (du%) and Inflation (dp%) in the EU-15, 1962-95     
     
increase that figure to 70%”. 
The reduction of unemployment is not among the explicit targets of the ECB or of any
other centralised institution of the EU. It is one of the objectives left to the national governments
of the member states which have agreed to collaborate to achieve it. At a special summit at
Luxembourg in November 1997 the European leaders hailed a new strategy for tackling the25
18 The European Commission had earlier called for quantifiable and verifiable targets,
such as “cutting the unemployment rate by 7% by creating 12 million jobs in 5 years”, to
strengthen the credibility of the fight against EU unemployment. But on 7 October 1997
employment and social affairs ministers from the 15 EU countries expressed concern that the
adoption of headline targets would raise false expectations that could lead to a popular
backlash if these ambitious objectives are not met. In other words, they doubted whether the
Commission’s targets and the timetable for the proposed solution of EU unemployment were
realistic.
unemployment crisis with an agreement on new common guidlines for job creation and helping
the young and the long-term unemployed. The proposed policies will be coordinated at the centre
but will be based on the EU member states which will have to submit national action plans to cut
unemployment once a year. Among the measures proposed to ease the problem of unemployment
in the next 5 years uneder the “employment guidelines” are included the following:
 the European Investment Bank would raise an extra Ecu 10 billion to finance small and
medium-sized businesses, new technology ventures and job-intensive projects in service
sectors including health and education 
 all unemployed persons under 25 would be offered a new start before being out of work
for six months  
 older unemployed persons would also be offered a new start within a year
 member states would have to simplify rules on small businesses, to develop more flexible
markets, and to reverse the long-term trend towards higher taxes and charges on labour.
Although these are moves in the right direction, the unemployment problem cannot not be solved
within 5 years
18. The point is that the existing high unemployment in Europe should not be seen
as the price we have to pay for monetary stability. The results presented here, which are
suggestive rather than definitive, imply that monetary policy for price stability can be achieved
but unemployment will continue to be high. If monetary integration results in more regionally
specialised production, which could increase the magnitude of idiosyncratic regional shocks, then26
the cost of monetary unification in terms of unemployed labour will rise. The policies of the ECB
should take into account the balance of costs and benefits for all the countries and regions of the
Community. 
6. Summary and Conclusion
The European Central Bank’s primary objective is the maintenance of price stability while the
objective of full employment is left to the member states which under the European initiative have
agreed to coordinate their policies to fight unemployment. It is usually assumed that in the short-
run there is a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment while in the long-run monetary policy
can achieve price stability with unemployment settling at its “natural” rate. The problem for the
ECB is that in Europe:  (i) the relationship between unemployment and inflation is not stable; (ii)
the “natural rate” of unemployment is  high; and (iii)  at the interregional level the response of
labour mobility to unemployment is low. 
In the EU member states inflation is low while the unemployment rate has remained high
and widely diverging between regions and across countries. One contributing factor to this
phenomenon is the relatively low labour mobility. This is manifested especially at the regional
level where significant regional unemployment differentials persist while labour from high
unemployment regions does not migrate in search of jobs to other regions within the same country
or other EU countries. This suggests the possible existence of a vicious circle: long-term
unemployment causes skill loss, which makes labour unemployable and therefore immobile. To
brake these conditions, the EU countries must raise the skills of the unemployed by concerted
action, which is a long-term project that will help reduce the natural rate of unemployment. In the
meanwhile,  if the timing of demand and supply disturbances differs across regions and EU27
member states, labour market adjustment cannot be the equilibrating mechanism necessary for
coping with shocks. 
Through time, region-specific shocks may become more frequent as a result of the effects
of the completion of the single market and of monetary integration on comparative advantage,
regional specialisation and reallocation of production and demand. Accordingly, it is often argued
that the low responsiveness of migration to unemployment means that Europe is not suited for
monetary union. This argument is based on the assumption that in the EU regional business cycles
are fairly pronounced and can be stabilised by exchange rate changes. However, the existence of
interregional differentials within countries suggests that the problem of European unemployment
has a regional dimension: many countries exhibit structural inequalities which result in the
coexistence of regions with high employment and regions with high unemployment. These
problems cannot be solved by national monetary policies. Therefore, although the problem of
regional disparities is important for economic welfare, it does not seem to be particularly relevant
for monetary integration.
 The European Central Bank (ECB) has no track record to rely upon and, therefore, it has
to establish its reputation and credibility. Our conclusion is that the ECB will be able to reach its
objective of price stability by GDP and inflation forecasts. But price stability will continue to be
accompanied by the burden of high and in the case of some disadvantaged regions increasing
unemployment which will be the cause of persisting and perhaps widening interregional
inequality. This will impose costs from income loss which must be set against the long-term
benefits of monetary integration to the disadvantage regions which might accrue by the diffusion
of growth and its positive effects on employment. Unemployment is undesirable because a scarce
resource, labour, is underutilised. Both, unemployment and inflation reduce society’s overall
economic welfare. Therefore, monetary stability will be more beneficial for the peoples of Europe28
if it is combined with policies fostering balanced growth with maximum employment. This
requires an integrated cohesion strategy encompassing policies for employment and regional
development which will induce and accelerate real convergence for all the regions of the countries
participating in the European Economic and Monetary Union.
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